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Abstract: Against a historical background of institutional development planning, strategic (yet 
pragmatic) flexibility is a crucial component of small state governance. A “strategy of flexible 
adaptation” is deemed to be the best management and leadership style capable of securing the 
best achievable outcomes in the evolving or abruptly changing scenarios that characterise small 
states. The smaller the state or territory, the greater the likelihood that its domestic, internal 
affairs will be dominated, responsive to and driven by exogenous factors (including terms of 
trade, tourism trends, migration flows, remittances, aid and other ‘rents’). Governments and 
institutions in small states need to suggest leadership and foresight in the trajectory of 
development while being agile and nimble at grasping opportunities, if and when they may 
arise. This paper first traces the manner in which ‘flexible specialisation’ dictates and drives a 
considerable amount of actions and decisions in small jurisdictions. It then explores how these 
structural obligations nevertheless transform themselves into the nurturing and maintenance of 
competitive niches, each of which comes along with specific skill set and infrastructural 
requests.  
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Introduction 
In his ‘election manifesto’ of March 2016, Professor Alfred J. Vella, now the Rector of the 
University of Malta, was candid about his difficulty of planning for a future that may not come 
about in the manner predicted by either the recent past or current realities. And so, he proffered 
a “strategy of flexible adaptation to secure best achievable outcomes in evolving or abruptly 
changing scenarios” as the best likely management and leadership style in Malta’s only national 
and publically funded university (Vella, 2016, p. 2). 
This is a rare, candid admission. And yet, what relates to this one person and one institution 
can be generally applied across the board in the world of small jurisdictions. The smaller the 
state or territory, the greater the likelihood that its domestic, internal affairs will be dominated, 
responsive to and driven by exogenous factors (including terms of trade, tourism trends and 
receipts, migration flows, remittances, aid flows and other rentier income) rather than 
endogenous ones. Additionally, and in such circumstances, the smaller the state or territory, 
the greater becomes the obligation of its government and other institutional structures to 
pretend that they can, and do, plan ahead, and thus control their own fate. This is to suggest 
leadership and foresight in the trajectory of development; while, in practice, the latter is more 
likely to prove an outcome of small state citizens and policy makers being agile and nimble at 
grasping opportunities if and when they arise, even if these may have little traction with any 
existing plans. The chronicle of ‘development’ in small states and territories is often much 
more easily constructed after the event, when a series of what are often discrete, disparate and 
serendipitous, sometimes contradictory, events coalesce as a coherent narrative of economic 
progress and modernisation when ‘played back’. Admitting this vulnerability of governance 
flies in the face of expectations, not least by policy makers themselves (who are policy takers 
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most of the time, dancing to the latest tune) and possibly by their publics who expect them to 
exercise more control over destiny. Governments are supposed to govern, after all. 
Using mainly secondary data, this paper suggests a narrative that departs from that discourse 
of security, predictability, goal setting and goal achievement that all states, including small 
states, take on, almost as a sine qua non of government, legitimacy and public trust. It first 
traces the manner in which ‘flexible specialisation’ dictates and drives a considerable amount 
of actions and decisions in small jurisdictions, with a focus on my birth country of Malta. It 
then explores how these structural obligations nevertheless transform themselves into the 
nurturing and maintenance of competitive niches, each of which then comes along with specific 
skill sets and infrastructural requests. I intersperse throughout the paper a commentary gleaned 
from the author’s own past research, as well as his current position as a member of Malta’s 
National Skills Council.  
The argument suffers from the weakness of being developed on the basis of a case study of a 
single small state: Malta is the state I know best; and my insider status allows me to come to 
better terms with institutional dynamics that often operate ‘under the radar’ and are rarely, if 
ever, documented. The observations and conclusions, however, are shared by a select and 
critical, small state literature which also claims that “national sovereignty does not always 
equal control” (Corbett & Connell, 2015, p. 435). 
In this paper, I also deliberately refrain from positing a definition of a ‘small state’, not just 
because this is problematic and elusive (Maass, 2009; Baldacchino & Wivel, 2020); but 
because this is not quite pertinent to the argument at hand. The processes described in this paper 
become more salient with decreasing state size; and they become the norm in the world’s 
smallest jurisdictions.  
Economies of Scope 
Panzar and Willig (1981) developed the term ‘economies of scope’ to describe a situation 
where it is more profitable to combine two or more product lines in the same firm than to 
produce them separately. The concept can be extended to describe the “security centered 
survival algorithm” of small state citizens (Brookfield, 1975, pp. 56-57).  
In lauding specialisation and the advantages of scale, mainstream economic wisdom discounts 
the strategic opportunism that characterises the citizens of many small states the world over. 
This involves behaviour grounded in economies of scope (and not economies of scale); these 
are the flexible and opportunist operations involving monetised, non-monetised, public/formal 
and intermediate/informal economies, both local and foreign, for overall economic gain 
(Baldacchino, 2000). This typically involves both employment and self-employment, 
simultaneously or successively. The life-histories of the inhabitants of small jurisdictions, 
where meticulously documented, tend to reveal a complex juggling of such antinomies. Thus, 
Isaac Caines, from the Caribbean island of St Kitts (profiled in Richardson, 1983); Kawagl, 
from the Melanesian South Pacific (profiled in Brookfield, 1972); and Marshy, street vendor 
from Jamaica (Wardle, 2002), all demonstrate a savvy skill repertoire in the economies and 
temporalities of scope which include entrepreneurship, flexible specialisation, public sector 
employment and stints abroad (also Brookfield, 1975; Carnegie, 1987; Comitas, 1973). 
In such a scenario, the key skill is to be able to adapt and respond, quickly and competently, to 
windfall opportunities, often impossible to predict ahead of time. A significant stock of “multi-
functionalism” is essential if one is to tap into what cannot really be planned for in advance; 
and which is then too late to plan for when it suddenly turns up on your doorstep (Bennell and 
Oxenham, 1983; Randma, 2001). 
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There remains a widespread need to better acknowledge and problematise the manner in which 
individuals, households, organisations but also governments in small jurisdictions develop 
mechanisms that allow them to exploit the benefits, and/or minimise the losses, associated with 
the episodic economic lurches that are the story of their lives. Operating with ‘strategic 
flexibility’ would explain how actors practise inter-sectoral migration: cleverly shifting focus, 
interest and scope, not just out of necessity (reactively) but in ‘smelling’ promising 
opportunities (proactively). In a scenario where change is taken as a given, learning about, 
managing and coping with such change become the hallmarks of economic survival: just like 
surfers handling an ocean swell (Baldacchino, 2011).  
The small developmental state 
The corollary to working in conditions of uncertainty and being prepared to adapt to, and adopt, 
the winds of change is the inherent difficulty in being able to plan ahead. 
Planning involves determining the appropriate actions that are required to make forecasts 
match objectives. Planning combines forecasting with a preparation for scenarios and how best 
to react to them. Forecasting, and the planning which it informs, should be an integral part of 
the decision-making activities of management. While effective planning in small states can 
only be indicative, it also needs to pre-determine or guess the broad directions that are likely 
to be taken or envisaged, at least in the short and medium term.  
It should not come as a surprise to note that, of all the areas of policy, it is education that has 
been the focus of planning in small states, and this is well documented in the small states 
literature (Baldacchino and Farrugia, 2002; Bray and Packer, 1993). Education is a policy field 
where returns and investments take time; where basic and core skills can be forecasted to 
remain in demand; and where generalist curricula, late resorts to specialisation and the 
portability and transfer of certification to desirable locations and markets overseas, remain the 
typical approaches followed in small jurisdictions everywhere (e.g. Bernal, 2018). 
Additionally, since the quantity of educational provision is driven by demography, this is more 
amenable to planning: birth and death rates do not change erratically and it is significant 
migration flows in and/or out of the small state that can wreak havoc with plans for more or 
less kindergartens, primary schools or adult education classes. 
But: planning in small states extends far beyond education. Development plans have sought to 
suggest the directions that small state governments wish to take. Such plans are drafted; but 
not necessarily as exercises that seek to predict and therefore nudge towards future scenarios; 
but as indications of a series of state desirables which may meet donor interests. Indeed, 
development plans have also been crafted with the main view to satisfy the requirements of 
private and/or public donor agencies that need to match requests to funding availability; as well 
as with a nod to domestic audiences and publics that expect governments to plan as a 
manifestation of their authority and competence. This expectation is irrespective of any sense 
of effective control on the independent (and mainly extraneous) variables that impinge on the 
planning process. 
30 years of ‘development planning’ in Malta 
Let me here narrate the experience of the small European island state of Malta (current resident 
population: 450,000 approx.) with the thirty ‘development planning’ years of 1959-1998 
(Baldacchino, 1998; Brincat, 2009). Malta’s approach to development planning has been 
indicative, avoiding the air of surety and certainty that was bound to be proved wrong. And 
yet, none of Malta’s six development plans got anywhere close to their purported targets: three 
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dramatically exceeded their objectives; and the other three disappointingly failed to get even 
close (Vella, 1994). 
Malta’s First Development Plan (1959-1964) followed hot on the heels of the 1956 Suez crisis 
and the UK Government’s subsequent decision to terminate its military facilities in many 
overseas bases, including its erstwhile Mediterranean fortress colony of Malta (Frendo, 2000). 
The island’s economy was facing an unprecedented radical shake-up. At that time, the colonial 
establishment directly employed some 23,000 Maltese: over one third of the labour force. 
British military personnel and associated expenditures – including rents, provisions, fuel, 
transport, energy and equipment – were going to be drastically and irrevocably cut, and for 
good. This much was the stark and sombre reality. The alternative sources of livelihood that 
would have to sustain the Maltese shorn of the infrastructure of a “fortress colony” (Craig, 
1991) – the only asset they had known and held for centuries in the eyes of others, as much as 
their own – were uncertain.  Foreign advisors were not optimistic: Woods (1945) had suggested 
mass migration; Schuster (1950) was of the same opinion. Balogh and Seers (1955) were 
cautiously optimistic, and for the first time officially proposed a concrete programme of export-
led development based on foreign direct investment. 
The First Development Plan made clear that the wealth which in the past, Malta had “derived 
securely and comfortably as a result of the crucial strategic role will inevitably decline” and 
could no longer be relied upon to support the standards of living to which the Maltese had 
become accustomed. And so, the Plan proposed to attract foreign industrial investment, which 
in turn required fiscal inducements (grants, loans, a 10-year tax holiday, exemption from 
customs duty), suitably skilled and cheap labour, plus basic physical services (efficient harbour 
facilities, adequate roads, power, etc.) along with the development of tourism. It foresaw the 
creation of 19,000 new jobs and assumed 10,000 employable workers would emigrate during 
the plan period. 
There was no way for the Plan to know whether what it aspired to could actually materialise. 
The rate of contraction of the UK defence establishment in Malta was also an unknown factor 
in the equation at the time. However, the plan was necessary for the UK Government, in 
January 1959, to contribute £29 million towards Malta’s development programme over a 5-
year period (Briguglio, 1981, p. 2). Indeed: 
The first development plan for Malta, covering the years 1959 to 1964 was based on a 
Lm29 million contribution by the British government (Briguglio, 1988, p. 205; my 
emphasis). 
And yet, the anticipated results did not occur. The Plan itself had to be reviewed in 1961 when 
it became clear that the downsizing of the UK base facilities would leave rougher and harsher 
consequences than had been planned for. Only 23 ‘aided industries’ materialised, of which 12 
were labour-intensive garment firms. When the Second Development Plan (1964-1969) was 
rolled out, it had to admit that “the [First] plan did not achieve the projected aims, mainly due 
to the fact that it was overtaken by events … the anticipated employment figures were not 
attained” (2nd Plan, p. 1). 
And so, the targets of the Second Development Plan were set with extreme caution. A report 
by a United Nations mission confirmed a bleak future and advised a mass yearly emigration 
quota of 10,000 to maintain existing living standards (Stolper et al., 1964). Political 
independence was secured in 1964 but there was no accompanying euphoria. The plan was an 
instrument of containment: “little more was expected of it than that it should keep the economy 
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ticking” (3rd Plan, p. 8).  The UK decision to devalue the pound in 1967 did not help much: the 
Malta pound was then pegged on a par with sterling. 
Yet the outcome went beyond expectations. Rapid economic expansion led to a 38% increase 
in GDP in real terms between 1965 and 1969. A Joint Anglo-Maltese mission early in 1967 
claimed that a target of 15,000 new jobs by 1972 was actually achievable. 
The Third Development Plan (1969-1974) sought to maintain the same basic recipe for 
economic growth. The one main novelty was an Association Agreement with the then 
European Economic Community (EEC). A net increase of 4,700 jobs was envisaged by growth 
in manufacturing and tourism, plus a continuation of outmigration. 
The actual state of affairs in 1974 was stark: 4,000 less jobs. This time, the planners were spared 
most of the embarrassment: exogenous factors were not lacking. The 1973 oil price hike was 
the significant independent variable over which they had no control; this event was the 
convenient scapegoat which masked a broader and perennial economic vulnerability. 
The Fourth Development Plan (1973-1980) cut short the life of its predecessor. There had been 
a transfer of power in 1971, and the incoming Labour government proposed a much stronger 
presence of the state in local economic development. While a slate of nationalisations occurred 
– in wireless, energy and air transport, for example – the Plan’s aspirational economic growth 
leaders were the usual suspects: manufacturing, ship-repair and tourism; and not other services, 
contrary to expert advice (Metwally, 1977). In spite of the political rhetoric of a ‘fundamental 
break with the past’, a new administration in a small state may have such limited room for 
manoeuvre as to basically be obliged to generally continue the policies of its predecessors 
(Scicluna, 1991, p. 2; Micallef, 2019). The time period of this plan witnessed the closure of the 
UK military base, which had been mercifully extended to 1979. This extension was only 
secured after hard bargaining, with annual rents of US$42 million (Wriggins, 1975). 
The year 1979 was therefore designated as the ‘year of destiny’ and the Plan sought to meet 
the challenge which the loss of the significant ‘fortress economy rent’ and other multiplier 
effects would inevitably cause. Provision had to be made for some 20,000 jobs over the plan’s 
7-year period, plus assuming annual emigration levels of 3,000, and so a net population 
decrease of 1%. Its targets were introduced with an indicative, cautionary tone; one which 
today can be seen to fit snugly within the paradigm of vulnerability and resilience: 
The Maltese islands are heavily dependent on international trade. Planning in Malta 
must therefore be particularly flexible. Flexibility means the creation and 
encouragement of attitudes and institutions that are capable of making good use quickly 
of a favourable turn of events in the world economy, and of adjusting speedily to 
unfavourable circumstances (4th Plan, p. 51). 
Instead of a net population decline, the Plan period witnessed a population increase of 5.7%, 
mainly due to unforeseen, tighter immigration controls in the traditional destination countries 
of Maltese emigrants: Australia, Canada, UK and US. Nevertheless, the gainfully occupied 
soared by 16,300, of which 8,000 in manufacturing alone. GDP at factor cost had grown at the 
phenomenal annual rate of 14.3 per cent. 
And so the planners could, for the second time, publically demonstrate their good fortune and 
take credit for the glowing economic results, in spite of their flawed predictive powers. And 
again for the second time, the euphoria and success – albeit unexpected, but who cares? – of 
the 4th Plan was paraded in the optimistic 5th Plan (1981-1986), with its target of 7,000 new 
jobs in manufacturing and 3,000 in services, plus a freeze on public sector employment. 
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The 5th Plan went totally wrong. Export, investment and employment targets went awry. A 
‘containment strategy’ had to be cobbled together to stave off the effects of a damaging 
international recession. Unemployment shot up to a record 8% in 1983 and 1984.  
The euphoria of planning was once again met with disillusionment. The sixth, and last, 
development plan covered only a 3-year period: 1986-1988. The time span had been shortened 
“… in view of the various unpredictable external forces that are expected to continue to weigh 
heavily upon Malta’s development” (6th Plan, p. 94). 
A change in government in 1987 led to the abandon of the sixth plan. 
Finally, six plans and 30 years later, the sober lesson appears to have been learnt: 
Recent experience has shown even more sharply the exposure of the Maltese economy 
to international economic developments and their impact on the country’s overall 
growth process. In these unsettled conditions, planning has been rendered more 
hazardous and it has become less meaningful to formulate development plans, spell out 
broad sectoral targets and draw up projections for future years, when outside shocks 
can be so frequent and unpredictable and prove so disruptive (6th Plan, p. 2). 
No further plans were drafted in Malta.  
 
The Fiction of Control 
It was actually never meaningful to craft development plans in and for Malta, except so as to 
provide a fiction of control over development which could align with donor interest and intent. 
The smaller the economy, the less control its governments have over its overall performance. 
The best that the governments of the world’s smallest states can do, really – although they are 
not likely to admit it – is to provide the ‘good governance’ and critical infrastructure that can 
‘rise to the challenge’ of opportunity quickly and effectively, when this presents itself.  
Multi-level governance increases the necessity to resort to this fiction of planning. With Malta 
a member of the United Nations since 1964 and of the European Union since 2004, an 
obligation to plan and chart the country’s future is necessary. Thus, to the domestic pressure of 
the need to show that a government is in control and can plan accordingly, are added the 
international obligations that result from external purview, audit and benchmarking. Moreover, 
there is a “natural desire to quantify, measure and evaluate” (Wilson, 2016, slide 16). Goals, 
targets and objectives characterise some of ways in which the UN, and Brussels, reach out to 
urge development in specific directions, such as the eradication of poverty and progress along 
the Sustainable Development Goals; as well as the reduction of unemployment, the increase in 
the female participation rate, greenhouse gas emissions, and the reduction in the number of 
youths, especially males, not in education or training (NEETs) (e.g. European Commission, 
2019). 
The Maltese government is also developing a skills/occupational anticipation system to 
forecast skill needs. This is partly in response to the caustic observation that “there is no 
particular institutional mechanism dedicated specifically to the anticipation of skills needs in 
Malta” (CEDEFOP, 2015, p. 37). A rapidly changing labour market environment makes it even 
more difficult to forecast future skill demand in and for the country (ibid.). Various skills-
relevant strategic documents have recently been commissioned by government and 
subsequently published. These include: a lifelong learning strategy, an early school leaving 
strategy, a vocational education and training (VET) and higher education strategy, a national 
youth policy, a national language policy, a literacy strategy, a digital literacy strategy, a post-
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secondary working group report and an employment strategy. Yet, one must wonder as to the 
effectiveness of such reports as skill forecasting tools. Their unintended consequence, perhaps, 
is to safeguard the country’s disposition towards generalist (rather than specialist) skills, 
including a repertoire which is often described as ‘soft’ or ‘people skills’ and which however 
is anything but soft: effective oral and written communication, pleasant disposition and 
courtesy, proficiency in multiple languages, ability and confidence to work in groups, 
willingness to serve, integrity, flexibility, self-discipline, a commitment to excellence, 
creativity and innovation (Robles, 2012). 
Retrospective narratives of development 
In small states, it becomes much easier to chart development trajectories after the event rather 
than before. A longitudinal look at the evolution of the Maltese economy in recent decades has 
seen it move firmly into the services sector. A rump of manufacturing activity has remained, 
including survivors from the spurt of the 1970s, but with some new additions such as in generic 
pharmaceuticals and aircraft maintenance. Ship repair has contracted and has been completely 
privatised. Tourism has matured, and expanded into various niche sectors (such as cruise ship, 
English language training, scuba diving, festival and medical care), topping 2 million visitors 
for the first time in 2016. Clusters which have been doing exceptionally well include: electronic 
gam(bl)ing, financial services, information technology and computer programming, legal and 
accounting services, wholesale and retail trade, and real estate. Aquaculture is now the main 
provider of fish products by value (and includes tuna penning).  
“Strategic pragmatism” has also been the consistent bottom line pursued by the economic 
development agencies of such successful, small states as Singapore (Schein, 1996). There, 
location and the prior exposure and experience as a regional port brought into existence a 
cosmopolitan and entrepreneurial society, wary of its existence surrounded by much larger 
countries, but being able to service these same countries with its superior infrastructure, 
logistics and knowledge capital. There, a technocratic government introduced and rigidly 
protects the principles of a multicultural society, and ensures that the economy is supported by 
considerable amounts of foreign, skilled and unskilled labour. 
Like Singapore, Malta qualifies as an entrepôt island economy (literally, a trading centre): “a 
market enjoying the fortress’s advantages of location and centrality, but generating internally 
the conditions fostering its success: specifically investment finance, entrepreneurial flair as 
well as a legal, regulatory and dispute resolution regime that facilitates market transactions and 
innovation by minimising cost and risk” (Warrington and Milne, 2007, p. 413). 
Looking forward, it is ‘fintech’ that has promise in 21st century Malta, and aligns well with 
existing expertise in financial services and information technology. Prime Minister of Malta 
Joseph Muscat has tweeted on March 23rd 2018 that:   
We aim to be the global trailblazers in the regulation of blockchain-based businesses 
and the jurisdiction of quality and choice for world class fintech companies” (Warren, 
2018).  
In 2017, the Maltese cabinet of ministers had approved the first draft of a national strategy to 
promote blockchain technology. Malta is also in the process of setting up a Malta Digital 
Innovation Authority to certify blockchain companies and establish a legal framework for 
initial coin offerings (ICOs). Binance, the world’s largest crypto-currency exchange, appears 
to be heading to Malta (Castor, 2018). And OKEx, the second largest such exchange, appears 
to be following suit: Malta is now being called ‘Blockchain island’ (Rud, 2018). 
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The diversification of the small Maltese economy is impressive (Grech, 2015). Its vertiginous 
rates of growth in recent years have generated a desperate need for scarce local human 
resources which – notwithstanding a 20 percentage point increase in the local female 
participation rate since 2000 – can only be met by immigrant workers, from both the European 
Union (especially from Italy) and Third Country Nationals (including Serbs, Russians and 
Filipinos). Unemployment is at a record low of around 3.6% and some 42,000 workers are now 
in Malta, a demographic that would have been impossible to predict even a few years ago 
(Iversen, 2018). Whether these foreign nationals will stay in Malta, deliberately spend a 
working period and then return home, or simply leave when the economy shifts to recession, 
remains to be seen. Should the Maltese economy continue to grow at current rates, an additional 
30,000 foreign workers will be required within a few years (ibid.). But: ‘current rates’ are 
notoriously hard to lock, going forward. 
The advantage of natural resource poverty 
Malta, like Singapore, Bermuda, Hong Kong and various small island states and territories, did 
not have a naturally available and exploitable economic resource. Malta is a resource poor 
archipelago: there are (as far as one can tell) no rich seams of mineral reserves on land or below 
ground, and no rich fish, marine stocks or economically viable oil or gas deposits offshore. 
Even the soil is shallow and alkaline; rainfall is scarce and seasonal. Individual fields and plots 
are small and not suitable for industrial farming. This ‘natural poverty’, recognised early on in 
the epoch of development planning (Bowen Jones et al., 1962), has historically spared the 
country from a powerful land-owning bourgeoisie which would have lobbied the state 
apparatus to protect or privilege its assets. A manifestation of this would be the plantation or 
mineral extractive economies of the island Caribbean, Fiji, Mauritius and Nauru. Whole small 
island state economies have become easily dependent on a main cash crop – be it tobacco, 
cocoa, sugar, phosphate, bananas or pineapple – distorting market signals and reducing the 
necessity of competitively tapping other economic sectors (e.g. Teiawa, 2014).  The absence, 
or low political clout, of a rural hinterland and its associated elites has saved such jurisdictions 
from “the slowcoach of agriculture” (Streeten, 1993, p. 199). Shorn of the protection of regular 
and reliable state aid (in the form of rents for military services), and with political independence 
thrust upon it (after a failed integration bid with the UK in the mid-1950s), Malta had to either 
sink or swim. 
And swim it did, although not always gracefully and swallowing some water in the process.  
What all this means is that, in retrospect, Malta has been generally capable of exploiting 
opportunities and to offer itself as a low-risk platform to export-led investment fuelled by 
foreign technology and serving foreign markets (Sklair, 2012). In the process, it has grown into 
a country with a resident population fast approaching the 450,000 mark, shifting from a ‘third 
world’ to ‘first world’ country – much like a Singapore of the West.  
These successes need to be seen as consequences of a mix of agency, serendipity and destiny.  
Malta’s weaning itself from the ‘fortress economy’ set-up coincided with an outflow of foreign 
investment from Western Europe looking for higher profitability by better managing labour 
costs (Grech, 1978). Accession to the European Union probably provided additional levels of 
political stability, institutional oversight and assurances of the pursuit of sound neo-liberal 
policies. A decent work ethic and a sound educational system continue to produce capable 
workers, including a wide competence in the speaking of English. And, on top of all this, 
whether because of the educational system or in spite of it, there is some resistance to excessive 
specialisation and a shrewd resort and disposition towards a broadening of one’s skill portfolio, 
and the banking on multiple sources of revenue generation.  
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The corollary of this at the national level is a “rapid response capability” (Bertram and Poirine, 
2007, p. 333); an agile and flexible regulatory framework. The machinery of government is 
adept at quickly creating the legislative mechanisms and protocols that respond to specific felt 
needs of actual or potential investment: to the extent that the ‘soft state’ (Hydén, 1983) may 
suggest itself as being a ‘legislature for hire’ and lend itself to capture by elites, local and/or 
foreign (Hampton and Christensen, 1999).  
 
These ideas extend and nuance the arguments of Armstrong & Read (2003), who suggest that 
the key ‘conditioning’ variables for small state development are openness to trade, human 
capital accumulation and location; or the thrust of smart specialisation strategies to power 
innovation (Asikainen, 2016; Breznitz, 2007; Foray, 2014; Ornston, 2012).  
 
Mastering the art of indirection  
Peter Katzenstein concludes his 1985 work, as well as his 2003 rejoinder, with an ‘Aesopian 
fable’, after the storyteller from Classical Greece, which is worth reproducing in full: 
 
The adjustment strategy of the small European states is summed up by the story of the 
snake, the frog and the owl. Fearful of being devoured by the snake, the frog asks the 
owl how he [sic] might survive. The owl’s response is brief and cryptic. Learn how to 
fly. None of the small European states have to soar like the eagle. What they have 
learned to cultivate is an amazing capacity to jump. Although they appear to land on 
their stomachs, in fact they always land on their feet and retain the ability to jump again 
and again in different directions, correcting their course as they go along. In a world of 
great uncertainty and high-risk choices, this is an intelligent response. Enough frogs 
can escape snakes, and the small corporatist states can continue to prosper: not because 
they have found a solution to the problem of change but because they have found a way 
to live with change (Katzenstein, 1985, p. 211; 2003, p. 30). 
 
Planning, and its associated narratives, may suggest soaring, an ability to chart one’s journey 
and plot one’s trajectory, with a modicum of dignity. Small European states, and small states 
generally, are unable to perform such grand exploits, to the consternation of many observers, 
agencies and external think-tanks who expect them to do better. To these external observers, 
the inability to soar (read: plan effectively) is often seen as a failure of small state governance, 
and an indicator of poor and rudderless development. And yet, while small states have no 
choice but to sham and fake their development planning, they still somehow get along; 
jumping, even if clumsily, from one opportunity to another, and somehow landing on their feet.  
 
Against a historical background of institutional development planning, strategic (yet 
pragmatic) flexibility is a crucial component of small state governance. 
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